Introduction: The Concept of Emergence
"Em ergence" is a term that has become popular in sciences dealing with m ental phenom ena or complex systems (Beckerman et al., 1992; Stephan 1998b; this issue, pp. 639-656) . In a dictionary sense "to em erge" means "to come into view, to become known or apparent, to rise from obscure or inferior conditions". This is pretty close to the use of the term in ordinary language and scientific practice. O rder "emerges" out of chaos, patterns out of noise, new types of organisms "em erged" in evolution and mental properties "em erge" out of neuronal acitivity. However, recently emergence has turned into a technical term. I will introduce here two distinctions: diachronic/synchronic and weak/strong emergence. If something new or un expected comes into being for the first time, then we speak of diachronic emergence. I will not deal with diachronic emergence in this paper. Syn chronic emergence, instead, refers to properties of complex systems composed of simple parts ar ranged hierarchially. Its weak variant is charac terized by the following features: (i) Em ergent properties are system properties, i.e. properties ex hibited only by the whole system but not by its elements (weight for example is not a system property), (ii) The properties of the system are causally determ ined by the properties of its com ponents, their arrangem ent and their interactions (synchronic or m icrodetermination), (iii) Em er gent phenom ena are only caused by physical prop erties, not by supernatural powers, forces like elan vital or a m ental substance (physical monism).
W ithout doubt such weakly emergent properties exist, e.g. the fluidity of water or the eigenfrequency of a resonance circuit. Initial and boundary conditions given they can be explained by or deduced from the laws of nature. In contrast, strong emergence is defined as weak emergence plus the thesis that (iv) the system properties are -in principle -explanatorily unreducible to the properties of the system's components, their arrangem ent and their interactions although the form er are synchronically determ ined by the lat ter. To call a property em ergent in the strong sense is not only to claim that those properties are not yet explained. Rather, it is to claim that there never will be explanatory reduction, regardless of how much we will know, even if we were to know everything about the physical world.
Qualia et alia
Do any emergent properties in the strong sense exist? This is highly controversial. Some think that they do (Stieve, 1997 , Chalmers, 1996 , some think that they do not (Vollmer, 1992 , Churchland, 1995 . But which properties might be strongly emergent in the first place? Explanatory irreduc ibility is almost exclusively claimed for subjective, mental properties directly or indirectly related to consciousness: qualia (the "what it is like" of a experience, e.g. the redness-quality experienced when seeing something red), em otions and feel ings, meaning and intentionality, the unity of self, self-consciousness, or free will. 1 Philosophers usu ally discuss principal arguments about why such properties might not be explanatorily reducible. One example is the argument of the nonalgorithmicity of meaning, another, the Tibetian-mill-argument for the nonreducibility of qualitative experi ences (for a critical discussion cf. Buschlinger, Vollmer and Walter, 1998) . However, all these properties may also be the subjects of empirical science. A fter a long period of prohibition, scien tists have started again to explore subjective states and consciousness. The last decade has seen a tre mendous increase of interest in these topics espe cially in cognitive psychology and neuroscience. Conferences are held, new journals are published, and renowned scientists set out to draw theories of consciousness. R ather than discussing these the ories, I will present some concrete examples of conscious and/or subjective phenom ena that are candidates for strong emergence. Furtherm ore I make a methodological claim: The only way not to become involved in discussions originating from rather doubtful thought experiments (for a critic see Wilkes, 1993 , Buschlinger, 1993 is to attem pt to reduce the properties, i.e. to be a m ethodologi cal reductionist. Why? -If you succed, then you have falsified the "in principalists". If you do not 1 The only exception are properties in quantum physics.
However, because they may be strongly emergent con temporary physicists sometimes claim that they are closely related to the phenomenon of consciousness, e.g. Penrose (1994) .
succed, then you might at least better understand why those properties cannot be reduced. Or, even better, you might generate new hypotheses about how to do so. So, even advocats of strong em er gence should be methodological reductionists for heuristic reasons. However, I do not claim to be able to present satisfying explanations for any of the mental prop erties mentioned above. Rather, I want to show the follwing: Firstly, there are a lot of interesting, real and relevant problems for empirical science related to the notion of subjectivity and conscious ness. Secondly, there are ways to approach them. Thirdly, if we do not decide to ignore them we have no choice: We have to confront rather philo sophical questions when investigating these phe nom ena (Walter, 1996a) .
In table 1, a selection of phenomena related to subjectivity and conscious experience is shown. All of them are currently investigated by the cog nitive neurosciences. (Many of them are described in more detail in Ramachandran and Hirstein (1997) , Joseph (1996) , Feinberg and Farah (1997) , Spitzer and M aher (1998) ). These studies have al ready yielded a huge amount of surprising answers and new questions for philosophy of mind as well as neuroscience itself (cf. Metzinger, 1995) . How ever, for the purpose of this paper, I restrict myself to the problem of volition.
Cognitive Neuroscience
Cognitive neuroscience is a new "emerging" dis cipline (in the diachronic sense) which aims to understand and explain cognitive phenomena by investigating their neural bases (Gazzaniga, 1995) . There are three major ways in which cognitive neuroscience ultimatively may contribute to the explanation of allegedly strongly emergent mental properties: lesions studies, neuroimaging experi ments and neurocom putational modelling.2 I will explicate all of them shortly. Lesion studies'. Pa tients with lesions in certain brain areas show cer tain functional deficits, e.g. aphasia. Neuropsychol 2 Obviously there are other scientific approaches like clinical studies, psychological experiments or animal modells. But for the question of explanatory reducibil ity the above mentioned approaches are the most im portant.
ogists conclude from this that the lesioned areas are necessary for this function in intact brains (cf. Damasio and Damasio, 1989, Farah and Feinberg 1997) . However, this approach is limited because of several reasons: The lesions might comprise only one of several critical structures that are part of a widely distributed network subserving this function. Furtherm ore, it might be the case that the lesioned structure normally suppresses some neuronal processes which are released after the lesion and result in disturbed function. Finally, as there is neuroplasticity in the adult brain, the lesi oned brain reorganizes itself at least partly and thus may not be a good model for intact brains.
In neuroimaging techniques are used that measure brain acitivity directly (EEG: electroencephalog raphy; MEG: magentencephalography) or indi rectly (SPECT: single photon emission tom ogra phy; PET: positron emission tomography; fMRI; functional magnetic resonance imaging). Whereas E E G has been used since long, the other tech niques are quite new. They allow not only to m eas ure brain activity but also to map it onto the ana tomical structure, so that localization of the activity becomes possible. Measures of electro magnetic activity have a good time resolution (in the range of msecs), whereas measures of regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF; mainly PET and fM RI) have a better spatial resolution (in the range of mms). The most widely used technique in cognitive neuroscience has been PET (Posner and Raichle, 1994; Frackowiak et al., 1997) , although in the last years the fMRI technique is used increasingly. It eventually might replace PET as the gold standard because of its non-invasiveness. The technical limitations and implicit assumptions of neuroimaging techniques bear problems of their own when applied to problems in philosophy of mind which I have discussed elsewhere (Walter, 1997a) . Nonetheless, neuroimaging is a rich source for neurophilosophy. In neurocomputational m o d elling (Churchland and Sejnowski, 1992 ) mental tasks can be simulated by a computer using neural networks (cf. Stein, 1998) . Although it is clear that simulating phenom ena implies that the modell omits something (cf. Buschlinger, Vollmer and Walter, 1998) Changeux and Dehaene, 1996) . In what follows I consequently refer primarily to lesion and neuroimaging studies of normal subjects and psychiatric patients.
The Problem of Volition
"Volition" is the act or power of making one's own choices or decisions. "The will" has tradition ally been regarded as a m ental faculty. A t least three varieties of will can be distinguished (cf. Kane, 1996) : desiderative will (what I wish), ratio nal will (what I choose), and striving will (what I try). In the early days of experimental psychology, about one hundred years ago, will was studied ex perimentally, e.g. by Rieger, Kiilpe, Ach, and W undt (cf. H eckhausen and Gollwitzer, 1987) . One reason for the interest in will was related to the practice of hypnosis that became popular at that time. Especially the phenom enon of posthyp notic tasks3 raised the question in how far people are in control of what they are doing. Although some psychologists have continued to work in this field, volition and will have been almost totally ig nored in academic psychology for a long time. Probably, this was due to the fact that will has been studied mostly by relying on subjective re ports, and also by its "dangerous" relatedness to the concept of free will. Recently, however, scien tists have regained interest in volition (e.g. Libet et al., 1983; Heckhausen et al., 1987; Frith et al., 1991; von Cranach and Foppa, 1996; Spence et al., 1997; Hyder et al., 1997; Walter, 1997b; Prinz, 1998) . Recent work in the neurobiology of volition can be discussed from a dedicated neurophilosophical point of view (Walter, 1998) . However, here I will take a more neuroscientific stand on these results.
Conscious Will: Half a Second Behind?
One of the most famous examples for the cogni tive neuroscience approach to volition is the study of the so called readiness potential (RP) (Libet, 1993) . The RP is a negative electrical potential occuring about one second before a self-paced movement is executed. This surprising long delay has led to a num ber of experim ents which trig gered a wild discussion on the role of conscious ness for willed action. The question arose: How is it possible that the "neuronal adequaecy" for a willed action is established before we become aware (are conscious) of the intention to move? This problem was raised by an experim ent done by Libet et al. (1983) . People were instructed to perform simple movements whenever they wanted to do so. The readiness potential was recorded. Simultaneously, the subjects were looking at a clock that had no arms but a fast revolving point which completed one cyle within 256 msec so that the 12 numbers at each "5 s" position corre sponded to approximately 2 1 msec of real time. Thus the subjects could rem em ber the clock posi tion in relation to subjective m ental events. The result was interesting: The onset of prem ovem ent neural activity (RP) started nearly half a second before people felt the "urge to m ove". With re spect to similar experiments utilizing sensory stim uli, Libet concluded that consciousness is always half a second behind: The neural processes would already be initiated before we become aware (con scious) of what is going on. This seems to be a challenge to what we call free will.
Unsurprisingly, Libets discussion received heavy fire from empirical scientists as well as from philo sophers. It is impossible to recapitulate this intri cate discussion without being superficial. H ow ever, the three most im portant arguments are the following: (i) One major drawback is the experi mental setting itself. The subjects did not react im mediately to their "becoming conscious" of the urge to move. Rather, they had to rem em ber it and reported it only some seconds later verbally. As memory processes may easily be distorted, as is known from several studies, this is a questionable timing method, (ii) There is an implicit assumption that there exists a point in time (or at least a very short time span) at which consciousness "enters the stage". Especially D ennett (1994) has criti 726 H. Walter ■ Emergence cized this "Cartesian theater". He argued that be coming conscious is not a precisely timed event but rather a -we might say "emerging" -result of parallel and intertwinned events of information processing extended in time, (iii) A nother critique seems the most crucial to me: Based on their own experiments with the readiness potential, Keller and Heckhausen (1990) have argued convincingly that no process of conscious volition in a strict sense is involved here. The "intention to move" had been formed already at the outset of the ex perim ent when subjects internalized the instruc tions. The "urge to move" should not be interpre ted as the beginning of a conscious volitional process but rather as the felt crossing of a thresh old, elicited e.g. by sensory reafferences (for a re lated line of argument cf. Walter, 1998) . Nonetheless, the Libet experiments have trig gered a lot of experimental work and theoretical discussions about the nature of will and conscious ness, and have led to progress. For example the readiness potential can not only be recorded when people do execute movements, but also when they only imagine them ("motor imagery", cf. Jeannerod, 1997). Thus, in some way, it becomes pos sible to study "pure thought".
With the help of pattern recognition by neural networks, even online thought reading has become reality. In order to see specific premovement neu ral activity it is necessary to average at least a few dozens of recordings because of the low signal-tonoise ratio. Neural networks, however, are able to recognize specific premovement activity ("desynchronization") in a single trial if properly trained. Experim ents were carried out where sub jects were instructed to perform or imagine one of three movements. Sim ultaneously, a computer tried to recognize premovement activity online. Feedback was given to the subjects about which movem ent the com puter recognized. Although the com puter was not perfect, the number of hits were significant above chance (Kalcher et al., 1994) . In a similar experiment, the neurosurgeon Walter Grey directly recorded from the cortex by means of im planted electrodes over the m otor cortex (cf. D en nett, 1994). Grey asked the patients to look at pic tures of a caroussel projector and told them that they could move to the next picture by pressing a button. What the patients did not know: the car oussel was not moved by the button press, but by the reinforced signal of their m otorcortex which actually started before the movement was exe cuted. Subjects were quite irritated because they had the impression that the projector anticipated their decisions! As should be obvious by now, many interesting questions arise from these paradigms of mindbrain reading. They are not only relevant for po tential therapeutic purposes (controlling artificial limbs) but also touch -nolens, volens -philo sophical questions about what it is "to be in con trol", i.e. the problem of free will. Now they can be approached empirically.
Imaging Willed Action
Recent work in the field of volition takes advan tage of the relatively new techniques of PET and fMRI. Both techniques measure cerebral blood flow which is an indicator of neural activity. In PET, resting cerebral blood flow can be measured quantitatively. In activation studies, a control con dition is com pared with an activation condition so that only specific task related blood flow shows up. Starting with the now classical paper by Frith et al. (1991) some studies have been carried out investigating "willed action". Typical experiments use reaction tasks as the -control condition (e.g. moving a touched finger, repeating words silently) and "willed action" as the activation condition (e.g. choosing a finger to move, freely generating new words beginning with the same letter as the stimulus). The stimuli in the two tasks are similar. In the form er only a stimulus driven reaction is required whereas in the latter internally generated action and thinking is involved what operationally is defined as "willed action" (Frith et al., 1991; Hyder et al., 1997; Phelps et al., 1997) . Calculating the difference in brain activation between the two tasks shows that a large part of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and -to a lesser extent -also the anterior cingulate cortex are activated. Classi cal lesion neuropsychology has already postulated the prefrontal cortex as the site of executive con trol, especially when perform ance is required that deviates from routine action (Shallice, 1988) . The anterior cingulate has only recently gained firm in terest for action and volition. Posner and col leagues have attributed the anterior cingulate a critical role for attention (Posner and Raichle, 1994) . Paus and colleagues (1993) have shown in a PET study that novel actions are correlated with activity in the anterior cingulate cortex with the precise location of the activity being dependent on the modality (manual, oculomotor, and speech). In general, the anterior cingulate is considered an im portant cortical region m ediating "drive" and the "selection for action" (for a good review cf. Devinsky et al., 1995) . Its location between pre frontal, limbic and prem otor systems makes it well suited to perform these functions. As the experi ments discussed below show, emotional factors m ediated partly by the anterior cingulate play an im portant role in volitional processes that are in volved in decision-making.
Feeling Reasons
To define "willed action" as "interally gener ated, not stimulus driven action" ist quite crude. As the example of obsessive compulsive disorders shows not every internally generated action is willed. In m ore sophisticated approaches to voli tion decision tasks are studied that are related to what I have called "rational will". (Choosing be tween alternatives is also the paradigmatic situa tion discussed in the philosophy of free will.) I will discuss two experim ental paradigms of decision making. Both aim at simulating real life decisions such that decisions are made under uncertainty or by use of incomplete information. Both of them show that em otions play a crucial role in practical reasoning. In this context, a hitherto neglected structure of the prefrontal cortex, namely its ven trom edial part, plays a prom inent role. Broadly spoken, the ventrom edial prefrontal cortex com prises all the parts of prefrontal cortex which are not dorsolateral, m otor or prem otor cortex. It also includes the anterior part of the cingulate cortex. In the literature, the term "orbitofrontal cortex" is also used quite often, which refers to the prefron tal cortex above the eye cavity. Although overlap ping, the extensions of both expressions are not identical. 4 One test sensitive for ventrom edial dysfunction is the so called "gambling task" (Bechara et al., 1994; . In this task, subjects choose cards from four decks and receive m onetary re ward and punishments. In the long run, two decks are winning decks and the two others losing decks. The task is constructed such that when starting the subjects do not have any idea which decks are the good and which are the bad ones. They have to find it out by trial and error. How did normal subjects perform? A fter turning about 20 cards, they started to prefer the good ones. The interm it tent debriefing showed that at that point the sub jects were not aware of their strategy. However, psychophysiological measures showed that some thing had happened. A fter some punishments had been encountered the electroderm al skin conduct ance response (SCR, an indicator of em otional in volvement) started to increase before the decision for one deck. With continuing to select cards, sub jects then started to report gut feelings that some thing is wrong with certain decks. Finally (after about 80 cards), most of the subjects (80%) understood which decks were good for what reason and perform ed accordingly, i.e. preferred the good ones. The conclusion is that emotions influence decisions under conditions of uncer tainty (as it is almost always the case in real life), even before subjects are aware of their feelings or their explicit strategies. But the story is even more interesting. Originally, the gambling task was constructed to measure deficits of patients with brain lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Patients al most never have lesions confined only to that re gion. But sometimes they have, usually as a result of an operation of an olfactory meningeoma, or of a rupture of an aneurysm in the anterior commu nicating artery. These patients show a striking clin ical picture. Although they do not suffer from the executive deficits as patients with dorsolateral pre frontal damage do, and although their intelligence is preserved, their lives change dramatically after the lesion. They perform badly in social life, are unable to reason appropriately in circumstances characterized by uncertainty, make real life deci sions in ways conducive to the m aintenance and betterm ent of themselves and of their family, and are no longer capable of succeeding as independ ent human beings. Additionally, their emotional life is disturbed in subtle ways (Damasio, 1994; Rolls et al., 1994; Hornak et al., 1996) .
So, how did patients with "acquired sociopathy" (the expression used in the literature), perform on the gambling task? First of all, they did not change their decision strategy during the task but contin ued to prefer the bad decks. This behavior was associated with a lack of anticipatory SCRs, al though the patients were able to show SCRs in other emotional situations. Additionally, the pa tients did not report feelings that some decks were strange. Most interestingly, however, patients still chose the wrong strategy even after they had reached the stage where they knew what the good and what the bad decks were (about 50% of the patients)! Somehow, the disturbed emotional feed back prevents that people act according to their rational insights. With the help of a delayed re sponse task and by analysing the exact location of the lesions it is possible to dissociate the contribu tions of working memory and decision-making per se in this experimental task (Bechara et al., 1998) .
A nother study involving decision making with emotional feedback was undertaken by Elliott et al. (1997) . This experiment, a variant of the tower of Hanoi task, has a two by three factorial design: two experim ental tasks (planning, guessing) and three feedback conditions (positive, negative, none). In the planning task, healthy subjects were presented with two arrays of coloured balls and asked to work out the minimum number of moves needed to transform one array to the other within a certain time limit, according to rules explained prior to scanning. In the guessing task, subjects were presented with two identical arrays of col oured balls. W ithout solving any task (no plan ning), they had to press one of six buttons and were told that three of them were randomly as signed as correct. Both conditions were carried out with positive, negative, or no feedback. The feed back was not related to the correctness of the answers but followed a fixed schedule. When sub jects were debriefed after scanning, they all claimed to have realized that the feedback was ir relevant to performance, approximately after they absolved half way through the total num ber of scans. But even then (in the second half), subjects perform ed objectively worse in the negative feed back condition compared to positive or neutral feedback. This strongly suggests that feedback car and the Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to Psychiatry ried affective salience, even when subjects were aware of its non-relevance! The cerebral activity during the task was measured with PET. The main result (for the discussion of volition) is that there was an activation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex associated with the presence of feedback in the guessing task. This is further evidence for the involvement of the ventromedial cortex as a criti cal structure mediating emotional feedback influ encing decisions under uncertainty ("real life con ditions").
Notice that for both experiments it is necessary to take into account the subjective and conscious experience during task performance. The subjects had to perform the task consciously: They did not only react to stimuli (as in the control condition), but had to think about them in a certain way, and had to be aware of certain features of the task. Most importantly, for the interpretation of the re sults, it is necessary to consider what the subjects felt and thought. In conclusion: We cannot ignore the subjective or the conscious component in these experiments. Rather, we have to consider them as central for the investigation.
The Body and the Self
In the gambling experiment the emotional sa lience of decisions plays an important role for practical decision making. But how are emotions "m easured"? And what are emotions and sub jective feelings? Emergentist often claim that we never will be able to explain them. But there is progress in understanding the neural machinery for decision making and the emotions involved (Dam asio et al., 1996). According to Damasio (1994) , an emotion is the combination of a mental evaluative process with dispositional responses to that process. For the evaluation the body plays a central role. W henever a person is thinking or imagining something, this causes changes of her body state. The body state is continuously repre sented in the brain. The feeling of an em otion is the experience of body state changes in juxtaposi tion to m ental images. Damasio calls the experi enced body states "somatic m arkers". Why? -Be cause the reaction of the body, or rather its central representation, "m arks" imagined or experienced events as good or bad, positive or negative and thus serves as a bias for action. However, the so matic m arkers are very crude biases: They do not indicate anything specific about a certain situation. Their evaluative nature is analogous to the evalua tive nature of pain: Experiencing pain only means that something is going wrong, that there is some possible harm and that something has to be changed.
How does all that relate to volition and deci sion-making? If a person has to make a decision the following happens: The person imagines pos sible outcomes or scenarios. These imaginations are generated by means of the prefrontal cortex. The prefrontal activity influences (via the ventro medial cortex) certain brain areas (especially the amygdala and the hypothalamus) which then in duce changes in body states. Those changes are represented online in the central nervous system. (There is also the hypothesis that an "as-if route" exists which is able to influence the central body representation directly.) If those induced changes depend on the individual past experience of the person, Damasio calls them "secondary em o tions". The feeling of a secondary emotion is the juxtaposition of a certain m ental image and the associated body states. Which body states are asso ciated with a certain situation depends on the per sonal history of the individual. For example, if a person has gone often through painfull or unpleas ant situations which are similar to the imagined scenario, the latter will induce body states which are felt as negative evaluative somatic markers. They do serve as a guideline for actions depending on the imagination of possible outcomes. This the ory explains why patients with lesions in the ven trom edial cortex are handicapped in their real life decisions. They miss the usual emotional bias so that their actions are guided mainly by short term gains, and do not take into account prior experi ences in a serious way. In philosophical terms, we might say that these patients have a defect in prac tical reason.
Although this explanation is not the only game in town (for an alternative explanation cf. Rolls, 1996) , and although it does not explain everything, e.g. why body states are felt at all (the qualia prob lem), we can state some progress. Instead of just claiming explanatory irreducibility the attem pt for explanation leads to new questions. Only because we have started to form ulate empirical informed hypotheses about allegedly irreducible, i.e. strongly emergent phenom ena, we may proceed further. For example, neuroimaging studies could be done with subjects performing the gambling task or similar tasks. W hat we expect is not only activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, but also in the network comprising the central body representation. The relevant representation of the body is postulated to reside in the secondary and tertiary sensorim otor areas (like SII or the insula) and some other parts, especially the right parietal cortex. According to Damasio (1994) , the body representation is not only the neural correlate for somatic markers but it also serves as the neural basis for a representation of the self.
Similar ideas are (again) becoming popular in philosophical thinking (Bermudez et al., 1995) . "Agency", the sense of being the cause and initia tor of one's own action, is an im portant ingredient of what is called free will. If we conceptualize voli tion as the self generation of alternatives and choosing between them, we can now begin to con struct a picture of the neuronal processes under lying volition. With a neurobiologically informed theory of the self in mind, we now might study phenom ena which involve disturbances of the self. There also are neural network models at hand that model the generation of alternatives and their se lection (Changeux and D ehaene, 1996) .
With the help of these and other results it is possible to approach the problem of free will. Even if there is no free will in a strong philosophi cal interpretation we might understand what it means to be autonomous from a naturalistic point of view. In order to construct a theory of natural autonomy which comprises the most im portant as pects of free will (being able to do otherwise, intel ligibility and agency) in a realistic interpretation, we need to get into contact with such empirical approaches (Walter, 1998) . In the domain of neu ropsychiatry there are a lot of phenom ena related to disturbances of volition and the self. They may be used to elaborate the above m entioned hypo theses. From this rich reservoir, I will discuss three examples.
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Antisocial Personality Disorder
The clinicial picture of ventromedially lesioned patients is called "acquired sociopathy" because it resembles very much the picture of what used to be called "sociopathy" or "psychopathy" and to day is called "antisocial personality disorder". It seems evident to study these patients in order to find out if there is a dysfunction of the corticalsubcortical loops mentioned above. Surprisingly, this has not been done yet. Why? -On the one hand, it is not easy to find patients with pure anti social personality disorder without any concomi tant psychiatric disorders. On the other hand, these patients are not easily accessible. One large group is found in prison. (Most of the neuro psychological studies with psychopaths have been perform ed with imprisoned patients.) The other group is even more difficult to study, and much less is known about them: the socially succesfull sociopaths. Many psychologist think that persons with antisocial personality disorder who are intelli gent and had a good education are not imprisoned, but rather become soldiers, explorers, or poli ticians.
However, there are at least some studies which show evidence for ventromedial dysfunction. Lapierre et al. (1994) have studied 30 psychopaths and 30 non-psychopaths in prison with six neu ropsychological test. Three of them are thought to be specific for orbiofrontal or ventromedial dysfunction (a go/no go task, the Porteus Maze Test, and the modular smell identification test), one for dorsolateral dysfunction (Wisconsin card sorting test) and two for posterorolandic dysfunc tion (mental rotation task, similarity subset of the Ottawa-Wechsler intelligence scale). The patients with an antisocial personality disorder were sig nificantly impaired only on the orbitofrontal-ventrom edial tests. There are also some preliminary neuroimaging studies which point to a possible ventrom edial dysfunction in m urderers and pa tients with personality disorder (Raine et al., 1994; Goyer et al., 1994) . From earlier studies it is known that the SCR is diminished in sociopaths (Hare, 1971) which is in good accordance with the somatic m arker theory, although not yet conclu sive. To further elucidate the theory of decision making, the same real-life-simulating decision tasks used in studies of acquired sociopathy should be adminstered to subjects with antisocial personality disorder, preferably with neuroim ag ing methods, as suggested elsewhere (Walter, 1996b) . 
Schizophrenia, Volition and Agency
A nother interesting disease for the study of voli tion disorders is schizophrenia. Certain forms of this disorder are characterized by negative symp toms like apathy, loss of interest, reduced drive and reduced daily activity which can be described as hypovolition. Liddle (1987) distinguished three syndromes of schizophrenia which are charac terized by the dominance of certain symptom clus ters: The psychomotor poverty syndrome (reduced drive and acitivity), the disorganization syndrome (incoherent speech and inappropriate affect), and the reality distortion syndrome (delusions and hal lucinations). He studied resting cerebral blood flow with PE T in all three groups in order to find out if there are symptom specific patterns of cere bral activity (Liddle et a l, 1992; Liddle, 1994) .
For our purpose the results in the first two groups are of interest. In the psychomotor poverty group reduced activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was found. The finding of "hypofrontality" has been confirmed in a lot of other studies, although there are also some controdictory result (for a review cf. Andreasen, 1997) . However, hypofrontality seems to be rather symp tom specific than disease specific as a very similar symptom (psychomotor retardation) in a different disorder (m ajor depression) shows the same pattern of reduced activity in the DLPFC (Bench et al., 1993). In the disorganization group of schiz ophrenic patients, another pattern showed up: hypoactivity of the ventromedial parts and hyperac tivity in the right anterior cingulate. This finding can be interpreted as a decoupling of prefrontalbasal-ganglia circuits resulting in a decoupling of action generation and planning on one side (prefrontal cortex) and selection for action (anterior cingulate) on the other side. This might possibly lead to an indiscriminate stringing together (disor ganization) of thoughts and actions. This is exactly what is found in this group of patients. So, "hypo volition" and "disorganization" seem to be asso ciated with disturbed activities in dorsolateral prefrontal and cingulate cortex.
However, most of these studies have been per formed with patients being in a resting state. R ather than scanning patients during rest, it is pos sible to have them perform a task during the scan. But this leads to another problem of interpreta tion. Activation studies in patients are com pro mised by the fact that controls and patients per form differently on the task. The question arises if dorsolateral hypoactivation is nothing more than the neural correlate of poor task performance which may be caused by a variety of pathomechanisms. So, studies are w arranted which also con trol for task performance. Friston et al. (1994) have studied controls and patients with a paced verbal fluency task in which performance of normals was adjusted to that of controls in order to be compa rable. Controls showed findings that were ex pected: Increased activation in DLPFC on the left, in the anterior cingulate and in the thalamus. A d ditionally, there was decreased activation in the posterior cingulate and in superior temporal cor tex. The results for schizophrenic patients were rather surprising. They also showed increased acti vation in the DLPFC, which in 6 patients with es pecially poor perform ance was actually larger than for normals. The authors argue that schizophrenics have to activate their DLPFC m ore than normals in order to achieve the same level of performance. The only consistent difference between both groups was that schizophrenic patients showed no decreased activation in superior tem poral cortex.
In another study with 12 unedicated patients the authors could replicate this finding and addition ally found a failure of activation of the anterior cingulate in a verbal fluency task (Dolan et a l, 1995; Flechter et al., 1996) . The authors then did m anipulate dopaminergic transmission (which is known to be distrubed in schizophrenia) by adminstering the dopam ine agonist apomorphine. They found a significant normalization of anterior cingulate activation and an attenuation of the ab norm al superior tem poral activation, expressed in the non-drug state, in the schizophrenic subjects. The authors conclude that schizophrenics show a disturbed fronto-tem poral interaction which can partly be normalized by manipulation of dopa minergic transmission. This is in good accordance with the known structural tem poral abnormalities found in schizophrenia.
In a study by Spence et al. (1997) , symptoms were controlled while patients were performing a m otor decision task. This study is of interest here because it relates to the hypothesis of the body representation as the basis for the neural self as spelled out above. Spence et al. studied schizo phrenic patients showing passivity phenomena, also called delusions of alien control (cf. Table I ). Delusions of alien control can be described phenomenologically as a loss of agency: Patients have the feeling that they are controlled by other peo ple or alien forces. For example, the patients in the study said things like: "I feel like an autom aton guided by a female spirit who has entered me dur ing the scan session", "The voices have some kind of control over my m ovem ents", "O ther people make me think certain thoughts" or "I could feel God guiding m e". Schizophrenic patients with this symptom were studied twice performing paced joystick movements on two occasions 4 -6 weeks apart. During the first scan, passivity symptoms were maximal, while by the second scan these symptoms had significantly improved in five of seven patients. Two control groups were scanned: Normal subjects as well as deluded schizophrenic patients without passivity phenom ena. A part from the activity associated with the m otor act per se, there was specific acitivity associated with the symptom of passivity: hyperactivity of the anterior cingulate as well as hyperactivity in the right pari etal cortex. The specifity of this activity was de m onstrated by the fact that it rem itted in the con trol scan in those subjects in whom passivity decreased over time.
These results are in good accordance with neu rologic findings of alienation (cf. Table I ): The alien hand sign (Goldberg and Bloom, 1990, Gasquoine, 1993) results from extensive lesion of the medial frontal cortex of the hem isphere con tralateral to the affected hand and/or the corpus callosum (which connects both hemispheres). Anosognosia (Feinberg and Farah, 1997) , some times referred to as a delusionary belief in health, is almost exclusively found after lesions of the right hemisphere. The localisation of these lesions as well as the results of the study of Spence et al. (1997) support the hypothesis of a bodily based neuromatrix of the self mediating the feeling of agency, e.g. the conviction of having se lf generated actions and thoughts.
Compulsive-obsessive disorder as a hypervolitional disorder
If we simplify the results concerning certain types of schizophrenia we might say that they re present a hypovolitional disorder. Are there other psychiatric diseases showing disorders of volition? Yes, there are. Obsessive-compulsive disorders (OCD) are characterized by the repetitive experi ence of unwanted and recurrent, perseverative thoughts (obsessions) and/or a compulsion to re petitively perform certain acts. Patients often re port that they have thoughts or do things against their own will. Although this disorder traditionally has been regarded as a neurotic condition, accu mulating evidence suggests an association with dysfunction in specific brain regions. The first studies of PET in OCD patients showed hyperacti vation of the right head of the caudate nucleus (a subcortical m otor structure) and the orbitofrontal cortex. More recent studies show symptom spe cific activation in those brain areas as well as in the anterior cingulate and several more brain regions McGuire et al., 1994; B reiter et al., 1996) . Baxter et al. (1990) have proposed a dysregulation in frontal-basal-ganglia loops as the pathomechanism of OCD. They hypothesized that a reduced filter function of the head of the caudate would allow "orbital 'worry' inputs" to direct the output of the caudate, resulting in a reduced inhi bition of the thalamus. This has two consequences: On the one hand orbitofrontal activity is en hanced, which creates a potentially self-reinforcing loop which is difficult to break. On the other hand, orbital worry inputs may come to have an indue, rigid influence on thalamic outputs to other brain region mediating OCD symptoms that are not lo calized to the orbitofrontal cortex.
These hypotheses get support from a recent fMRI study (Breiter et al., 1996) . When symptoms were provoked with aversive stimuli during the scan sessions an enhanced activity could be ob served, amongst other regions, in the medial orbi tofrontal cortex, the lateral inferior prefrontal cor tex, and the anterior cingulate. In further accordance with an orbitofrontal dysfunction, Abbruzzesse et al. (1997) could show that OCDpatients, compared to normal controls and schizo phrenics, are selectively impaired on an orbito frontal test (OAT: object alternation test), while performing normally on a dorsolateral test (Wis consin card sorting test).
With another neuroimaging study with OCDpatients it could be shown for the first time di rectly that both succesfull psychotherapy and i: Psychological, neurological and psychiatric phenomena already studied by the cognitive neurosciences which refer to subjectivity and/or consciousness and thus may be used to investigate 'strongly emergent' properties.
Phenom enon
Description (and a recent reference)
Blindsight
People with an infarction in the occipital lobe do deny seeing anything, but demonstrably actually do use visual information in their "blind" visual field, e.g. when they are forced to guess a number presented to their "blind" field (Stoerig and Cowey, 1997) . People with damage to the visual pathway causing blindness in either a large portion or in the entire visual field experience vivid visual hallucinations in their "blind" field (Fernandez et al., 1997) . The failure to report, respond, or orient to stimuli that are presented contralateral to a brain lesion which is not in the primary cortex. For example, people do eat only the left side of their meat on a dish but claim they have finished (Farah and Feinberg, 1997) . Unawareness of neurologic defects or illness. People with right hemisphere lesions often deny their left hemiplegia. Usually after large right hemispheric lesion on the right (Farah and Feinberg, 1997) -» ■ Anton's syndrome. Blind people, e.g. after bilateral occipital infarction, deny that they are blind (Farah and Feinberg, 1997) . The inability to recognize people's face. Usually caused by bilateral lesions in the inferior temporal lobes (Farah, 1990) . Sensations evoked by stimuli in one modality produce vivid "qualia" normally associated with an other modality; patients "see" sounds or "hear" colours (Paulesu et al., 1995) . Amputees feel their missing link, mostly in the form of pain, and might, by tricky experimental manipulation, even experience moving it (Ramachandran, 1994 (Hirstein and Ramchandran, 1997) . Loss of will after lesion of the anterior cingulate. People do and say nothing, although they are not aphasic or paralyzed (Damasio and van Hoesen, 1983) . One hand, usally the left, acts "autonomous" and is no longer experienced as ones own. For exam ple, the hand will grasp something without its owner wishing to do so and the owner might have to detach it with his healthy hand. Associated with lesions in the medial anterior part of the brain (Goldberg and Bloom, 1990) . The distinct feeling that some invisible being is close by. Often reported by mountaineers, explor ers, single-hand sailors, and castaways but also after brain lesions in both hemispheres (Brugger etal., 1997) . Epileptic seizures originating in the temporal lobes, especially the left one, show many features we asscociate usually with awareness and consciousness (Joseph, 1996) . Actions may not be performed but only imagined. It is possible to study the correlated brain activ ity and thus to study "pure thought" (Faw, 1997) . It is possible to study the cerebral correlates of sleep dream as a special form of consciousness with neuroimaging techniques (Braun et al., 1998) . Dream states in which people are aware of the fact that they are dreaming. Accordingly, they dare to do unusal things, like jumping from a bridge, going through walls, etc. Lucid dreaming can be trained (Gackenbach and LaBerge, 1988) . Vividly hearing or seeing things which are not there. Mostly seen in schizophrenia (Andreasen, 1997, Spitzer and Maher, 1998) . A subjectivly sure conviction, uncorrectable by empirical evidence, that something is the case what is objectively wrong, e.g. to be persecuted. Typically seen in schizophrenia, but sometimes also as sociated with brain lesions (Andreasen, 1997, Spitzer and Maher, 1998 ) -> passivity phenomena., misidentification syndromes, anosognosia Being convinced that someone or something is controlling ones actions or thoughts. In Angloamerican psychiatry refered to as "delusions of alien control", in German psychiatry as "Ichstörungen" (I-disorders). The border between "I" and world becomes permeable; psychic pro cesses are not longer experienced as belonging to the "I" but as made from the outside (Spence etal., 1997). Acting or thinking something against ones will without being able to stop doing so. For example, people cannot help washing repeatedly their hands or thinking obscene thoughts. Probably a neurobiological disorder (Breiter et al., 1996) . Pseudoneurologic symptoms (disorder of voluntary movements or sensory functions) that are due to an organic lesion but also not simulated (not consciously pretended). The disorder is thought to be the result of psychic conflicts (Mace, 1992) . D issociative identity The existence of two or more distinguishable identities or personal states, which repeatadly take disorder control over the behavior of a person combined with an extraordinary inability to remember im portant personal information. Formerly known as multiple personality disorder. Sometimes doubted to exist (Miller and Triggiano, 1992) . . The only com m on finding after both therapies was a reduction in the p re treatm ent hyperactivation of the right head of the caudate nucleus. In contrast the alteration of activ ity in the anterior cingulate gyrus did depend on the type of therapy: W hereas drug responders showed no correlation between the extent of clin ical improvement and metabolism in this area be havior therapy responders tended to show an increase of activity in the anterior cingulate. Schwartz et al. (1992) speculate that this may be explained by the fact that an elem ent of will is necessary for succesfull behavior therapy because the patients need to exert an effort to control be havioral responses.
In the light of the other studies on pathological volition discussed above a hypothesis may be for mulated: Obsessive compulsive disorder can be in terpreted as a "hypervolitional syndrom e". Due to a pathological positive reinforcement, the orbitofrontal-basal ganglia loop gets decoupled from the representation of the neural self (the representa tion of body changes in the right hem isphere), so that a feeling of alienation results ("/ do not want to do this!"). In this respect OCD is a counterpart to the psychomotor poverty syndrom in schizo phrenia.
Schizophrenia as well as OCD are good exam ples for the fact that neuroimaging studies are only intelligibly interpretable in the light of hypotheses and theories. The neural proceses determining mental functions are much more complex than simple hypo-or hyperactivation hypotheses do suggest. For many complex mental functions, we will not just find one brain area lighting up more strongly here or less intense there. R ather, we must interpret observed activities as signs of dysregulations of interconnected and interacting cor tical areas resulting in specific clinical pictures.
Conclusion
The most promising candidates of strong em er gent properties are to be found in the realm of mental phenomena. To call a m ental property strongly emergent means to claim that it can not be explanatorily reduced to the properties of the underlying neural systems. I have argued that this should be understood as a challenge for scientist to try to explain subjective phenom ena associated with consciousness. I have presented a list of phe nom ena studied in the cognitive neurosciences which are interesting in that respect. Furtherm ore, I have discussed empirical investigations concern ing willed action, decision making and agency in more detail. It goes without saying that we do not yet have explanatorily reduced those phenom ena in a satisfying way. However, the discussion might give more credit to the point of view that we should be methodological reductionists even if those m ental phenomena finally should be em er gent in a strong sense: It is the only way to make scientific progress.
